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Given the ample evidences from present studies on national-level 
innovation policies evolution and mechanisms, this paper contributes to 
a city-level understanding towards innovation-related state restructuring, 
the consequent innovation policy change and its relational performance 
with urban development in post-reform Shanghai, China from an input-
output perspective. It unfolds that state restructuring relinquishing state 
power to the market has revived non-government innovation activities and 
a synchronous, though a bit backward, firms-oriented transition towards 
innovation development in Shanghai throughout 1990s has been observed. 
Though scholars are reluctant to label the party-state in post-reform China 
as a developmental state due to dysfunctionality of state intervention 
in corporate sectors, in the field of technological upgrading, such top-
down, elite driven and state-sponsored mode giving priority to innovation 
competitiveness well captures the developmental state model at local 
level, thus exhibits elements of local developmental state. Impacts of this 
restructuring and policy change are substantial, which can be observed in 
the soaring increase of science and technology expenditures and patents 
applications in Shanghai. Additional analysis further unveils that in most 
circumstances, innovation growth kept paces with urban development, yet 
its synergy with economic development and permanent residents is more 
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1. Introduction
State restructuring, referring to the decentralization 
of state power to the local and the market in post-reform 
China, profoundly remolds the geography of institutions 
and induces multi-scalar reorganization of state power 
at both the central and local level [1-3]. Interpreted in the 
work written by Brenner, state restructuring is inseparable 
from space of neoliberalism wherein the organization of 
state is not pre-given [4]. In other words, the state must 
cope with diverse array of mixed forces that technological 
progress is a significant one. Thus, it is not a surprise that 
the worldwide innovation fever resulting from state re-
structuring has witnessed an increasing state intervention 
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at different geographical scales. While much literature 
on China’s state restructuring has been preoccupied by 
its powerful effects on economic growth and urban trans-
formation [5-8], less is noted on how this profound reform 
steers and reshapes innovation development, development 
that has increasingly become the key force for economic 
transition and upgrading. In few studies touched upon this 
topic, their primary focus is at the macroscopic national or 
regional level, interrogating how policies and spaces have 
evolved under the innovation related restructuring [1,9-11], 
whether innovation policies and its outputs in the cities 
synchronize those at the macro level and how they per-
form is less clear. We can simplify the urban-level inno-
vation process as resulted from inno-state restructuring by 
which innovative activities are spatially evolved and reso-
nant with local urban development. To enrich a city-level 
understanding towards innovation process against the 
backdrop of national state restructuring, this research 
interrogates how marketization of state power reshaped 
innovation landscapes and how related policy actions and 
urban development factors relate to urban innovation effi-
ciency. 
Shanghai has long been a progressive city as China’s 
new, handy growth model [12] and illustrates central state’s 
intentions for “molded, managed” capitalism with its 
emerging planned-market. Being a trading port since Qing 
Dynasty, Shanghai developed alongside the rise of mod-
ern China and has gradually evolved to a solid industrial 
base epitomizing China’s modern industrialization, with 
intense intervention and power struggle from upper level 
governments. In most up-to-date orientation from the cen-
tral state, Shanghai, alongside Beijing and Shenzhen, is 
shouldered to lead innovation development in the coming 
years, and serves an ideal case to illustrate urban innova-
tion development and efficiency under the macro techno-
logical policy transition. 
2. Innovation Policy and State Restructuring 
in Post-reform China 
In China, science and technology (S&T) develop-
ment has long been a commitment from the top design. 
Before the well-known market-oriented reform, public 
research organizations (PROs) stood by government and 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) exempted from market 
competition were the principal executors for R&D [13]. A 
market-leaning innovative atmosphere arose in the 1978 
National S&T Conference and was further ignited in 1985 
that non-government R&D funding and technology activ-
ities appeared. In 1990s, the original PRO-centered inno-
vation system had evolved firms-oriented, a shift fostering 
firms’ innovation capabilities, commercializing technol-
ogy, and enhancing efficiency of the innovation system 
[14,15]. Marketization pace has reached a peak during Zhu 
Rongji’s premiership (1998-2003). Policy over S&T has 
been dissociated from heavy industry while natural and 
human scientific research was reiterated. Relaxation of 
state power to market has brought evidently less govern-
ment intervention in high-tech sectors such as integrated 
circuit fabrication, nuclear power technology and civilian 
aircraft. But this doesn’t mean that state support was no 
longer important. Instead, state has played a great role 
in launching and implementing key national innovation 
strategies. For instance, to implement the strategy of “re-
vitalizing the Nation through Science and Education [keji-
ao xingguo]”, the state raised budgetary allocation for the 
Chinese Academy of Science, increased grants approved 
by the National Natural Science Foundation of China, and 
invested large amount of funds to higher education insti-
tutions [9]. The state also insists on the open-door policy 
to allow foreign direct investment as a crucial channel for 
technology transfer and upgrading. To further integrate 
into the international market, the state paid more attention 
to intellectual property rights especially agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [10]. 
Unleashing the power to facilitate innovation devel-
opment in China has boomed the debates on whether 
post-socialist Chinese state can be characterized as devel-
opmental state (DS) as technological upgrading and inno-
vative capabilities are key to the DS model [16-18]. Scholars 
working on DS point out that this model serves two main 
purposes: (1) to look beyond the American-Soviet com-
parison and (2) to connect interventionism with rapid 
economic growth happening anywhere in the world[19]. 
In general, theory of capitalist developmental state was 
earliest originated from explaining the East Asia industri-
alization (particularly Japan and the Four Dragons) under 
an ideal type of an interventionist state that was neither 
socialist nor free-market in nature [20]. In a capitalist de-
velopmental state, an “embedded autonomy” secures a 
social embeddedness to bureaucratic economic growth 
[21]. As Ronald Dore noted, the Japanese don’t believe in 
the invisible hand, so that state-guidance and intervention 
are placed in the centerpieces of the DS model [22]. As a 
nationalist ideology prioritizing economic growth at the 
top of all the national affairs, the DS model also places 
the interests of the state over those of the individual, blurs 
the sphere between the public and private, pulses-on de-
velopment as the most important legitimizing principle of 
the state, embraces plan rationality as opposed to market 
rationality, and selects autonomous technocratic, eco-
nomic bureaucratic elites to serve the national interest [23]. 
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Noteworthy, as proclaims by Johnson, this plan-rational 
growth model does not mean to exclude any private forc-
es. Instead, they are allied with the state technocracies to 
serve the national goals, especially the development of 
competitive industrial sectors. 
Indeed, scholars comparing China’s growth pathway 
to that of the capitalist developmental states in the named 
East Asian countries are reluctant to label the Chinese 
post-socialist party-state as a developmental state, es-
pecially before 2000s [20]. In most cases, they tend to ac-
knowledge that the operation of Chinese state, recognized 
by Castells as “state capitalism” or the “socialist market 
economy” [24], exhibits similar characteristics to that of DS 
(e.g. intentionally steer economy towards innovation) but 
is not identical to its archetype [25]. In innovation-related 
fields, China’s main difference from the DS was found in 
the dysfunctionality, sometimes negative effects, of state 
intervention in the corporate sectors in the early days of 
reform [18,26]. In other words, the early destatization was 
not contributing much to China’s entrepreneurship, it is 
the spontaneously developed town and village enterprises 
that went across the rivers by feeling the stones did [27,28]. 
This challenges the role and functions of the party-state 
in China’s economic development. To many scholars, 
China’s state restructuring characterized by dismantling 
of state power and fiscal decentralization had transformed 
local governments with strong developmental interest, 
formulating plans, attracting investment, and financing 
infrastructure to create economic miracles. Such devel-
opmental behaviors of local states were akin to those of 
its East Asian counterparts, and thus local developmental 
state (LDS). But as Zhu acknowledged, China’s local state 
is a developmental state of its own kind [29], which is em-
powered by central government with economic autonomy 
and bear more liability for local prosperity but remains 
politically at the command of upper level government [28]. 
This can be verified in the strong control force of local 
government in the growth coalition formed by foreign, 
private and government sectors in urban redevelopment 
[30], as well as efficient execution of upper level command 
during the COVID-19 pandemic [31]. Yet, scholars also 
noticed that such developmental ideology did not always 
benefit the local. For instance, weak leverage of local gov-
ernment in guiding the market forces leads to the inferior 
and suboptimal built environment [29]. Policy coordination 
thus is necessary to better serve local sustainable develop-
ment. 
In view of the previous research findings, this paper 
assumes that in the field of innovation development, local 
governments in Chinese city reflect elements of the DS 
model, thus LDS in nature. And, through the perspective 
of policy evolution, this research further interrogates to 
what extent and in what aspect the LDS model capture 
the innovation evolution alongside the elapse of time, and 
how innovation outputs, under this evolution, relates to 
pros and cons of urban development in different time peri-
od. Shanghai pioneering in China’s innovation strategy is 
selected as the case for a longitude study throughout 1985 
to 2015 to generate insights for other cities. Diverse range 
of data such as patent records, archives, research such 
as published articles, statistical yearbooks, government 
working reports, local newspapers, and urban planning 
documents are broadly consulted. 
3. Shanghai’s Innovation in Action
3.1 Inputs from Local Government 
“Shanghai has been the center of a vortex of economic 
change spreading from the city to engulf the rest of China, 
and the pattern of its development during the past century 
has been modern China in microcosm” [32]
Shanghai’s policy and inputs on innovation develop-
ment generally synchronize those at the macro level and 
represent another microcosm of innovative China. The lo-
cal’s innovative boom not only demonstrates a competent 
government action towards innovation but also reveals an 
efficient allocation of central state’s vision for a powerful 
nation of science and technology. 
3.1.1 Policy Inputs on Innovation: Evolved 
Firm-centered, Open Sharing and State-market 
Hybrid 
Since the first national S&T conference held in 1978, 
the role of Shanghai municipal government to foster inno-
vation development has transited from a passive gatekeep-
er approving research projects and funding to an active 
planner making pro-innovation policies, organizing and 
coordinating macroscopic technological development. It 
showcases strong impetus to articulate the nation’s mar-
ketization reform and visions for innovation and exhibits 
features of LDS in innovation policy making mainly in 
three aspects. 
First, the government has made great efforts to steer 
non-state actors to be innovative and to release their inno-
vation motives through policy initiatives and guidance for 
the national goals of innovative economy. In this regard, 
investment of science and technology is no longer purely 
government funded, but comes from diverse channels 
include NGOs, individuals and firms etc., in which firms 
evolved increasingly important in the local innovative 
boom. Specific measures include the effort to incent vital-
ity of scientific and technical personnel, allows scientific 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jgr.v4i3.3173
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and technical staffs in the non-profit state supported R&D 
institutions to run their own companies for profit-making. 
Also, the main forces and preferential policies for techno-
logical progress have shifted from R&D institutions and 
universities to firms. By doing so, the government has 
opened up the enclosed innovation system and shaped it 
as market-oriented, firm-centered and political/industrial/
academic/research-integrated. Second, the government has 
transited from providers of cheap labor and land absorbing 
foreign capital and technology, exemplified in the early 
established development zones (e.g. Minhang, Hongqiao, 
Caohejing), to pathfinders encouraging open sharing and 
nurturing local core- and high-tech firms, fundamentally 
practicing LDS that emphasizes indigenous impetus. At 
the national level, open door policy over S&T is amplified 
from usual communications, ordinary cooperation to joint 
development. Ideas of sharing are prioritized to chase the 
upper chain of R&D. In Shanghai, sharing part of the core 
technology should be a must when negotiating with for-
eign investors to settle. Also, in contrast to the traditional 
platform committed to serve narrow, specialized scientific 
research, technological service system has become more 
open sharing to foster high-technological clusters and new 
pillar industries, rather than merely focus on identifying 
technological potentials and transforming traditional in-
dustries. In such sense, Shanghai has been upgraded from 
a place transplanting advanced technologies from devel-
oped areas to an eco-system incubating up-to-date innova-
tive ideas and nurturing new inventions. Third, innovation 
clusters are intentionally fostered and incorporated into 
urban spatial plans that are the regulatory product under 
a market economy. As the dragonhead in Yangtze River 
Delta, Shanghai got substantial policy supports from cen-
tral government and formulated numerous planned for 
nurturing innovation activities. For instance, in the “22 
opinions to promote Shanghai technology and innovation 
center”, six innovation clusters including Zhangjiang, 
Zizhu, Yangpu, Caohejing, Jiading and Lingang are spe-
cially proposed. In the newly approved Shanghai master 
plan (2017-2035), a stratified innovation spatial system is 
planned. There are also knowledge-intensive universities 
and research institutes (e.g. Tongji knowledge economic 
industrial circle in Yangpu) contributing to the basic R&D 
and incorporated into these plans. All these initiatives 
represent a hybrid approach involving state-market inter-
actions. 
3.1.2 Investment Inputs on Innovation: Diverse 
Funds Dominated by Local Finance
Innovation inputs comprised of R&D investment, 
financial expenditure, infrastructural initiatives, and gov-
ernment service supports etc. are revealed in this section 
and related to broader institutional and policy changes. It 
is found that local finance dominates the innovation in-
vestment, with main sources come from firms since 2000. 
In the meanwhile, foreign investments are minimum and 
decreasing whereas funds from the governments are con-
siderable and grow. Among the three types of innovation 
research, basic research receives the least funding support 
and the most money goes to experimental development. 
Firms still are the main executive departments and very 
few executions are from universities. In general, R&D in-
vestment and its ratio to GDP have increased yearly since 
mid-1980s, from 462 million RMB, 0.99% in 1985, 767.3 
million RMB, 1.6% in 2000, to 104.9 billion RMB, 3.7% 
in 2016. S&T expenditure of local financial increases 
from 2.49 million RMB in 1985, 10.08 million RMB in 
2000, to 341.71 million RMB in 2016, but its ratio to the 
total fluctuated in recent years, decreasing to a low ebb of 
4.59% in 2008, arriving at a peak 7.2% in 2009 and de-
clining thereafter. 
Infrastructural initiatives to buttress innovative activ-
ities are primarily natural science-based, investment in 
social and humanity is nil in most years and has been very 
few until recently. The most dazzling infrastructural ini-
tiative is the large-scale scientific facility which contrib-
Figure 1. Financial expenditure on R&D and its ratio to local revenue
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jgr.v4i3.3173
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utes greatly to major innovations in Shanghai. Shanghai 
Synchrotron Radiation Facility (SSRF), National Center 
for Protein Science Shanghai and Submarine observation 
project are three topmost important large scale scientific 
facilities where most patents, scientific publications and 
new inventions come from. All these achievements are in-
separable from government service support for innovation, 
which has undergone several stages for the past decades. 
From early to mid-2000s, advance intellectual property 
protection, commercialization of S&T, and financial in-
vestment rules on S&T enterprises were the main area 
of service support, protecting original innovation. Then, 
government had evolved to promote S&T finance and 
business service from mid to late 2000s, with the maturity 
of innovation policy system (marked by industrialization 
of high-tech) from late 2000s to mid-2010s, promoting 
commercial synergy with R&D. Since 2015 onwards, 
Shanghai’s innovation has entered a new stage with many 
of the policy and institutional designs implemented to 
help a sustained, self-innovated development pathway. 
For instance, the “Opinion of Shanghai Municipal Party 
Committee and Shanghai Municipal People’s Government 
on Accelerating the Construction of Globally Influential 
Science and Technology Center” and “Supporting Policies 
on Increasing Revenue Support to Accelerate the Con-
struction of Globally Influential Science and Technology 
Center” were all promoted in 2015. 
3.2 Outputs and Relational Aspects with Urban 
Development 
3.2.1 Innovation Outputs: Evolved to Firm-domi-
nated Pattern 
Among the ways of measuring innovation outputs, this 
research deploys patent data which strongly correlated 
to R&D spending to showcase innovation intensity and 
knowledge production in Shanghai. Over 819,000 patent 
records applied from Shanghai since 1985 were identi-
fied from National Intellectual Property Administration. 
Each application records detailed information of patent 
type, application date, patent number, patent title, patent 
abstract, applicant, and applicant address with postcode. 
Though the initial 730 applications in 1985 were almost 
negligible, it signified a startup of Shanghai’s innovation 
development. And, the increase of absolute number of 
patent applications has been up to 12 times in the past 
17 years, surging from around 9,000 in 2000 to around 
110,000 in 2016. Classifying patent records by the nature 
of the applicant (individual, firm, university and research 
institute, and authority), it is identified that individuals had 
been dominated the applications in early times, accounting 
40%-50% before 1998 and reaching the peak of 52.1% in 
1993. In all the 28,000 records between 1985 and 1999, 
42% were from the individuals. Applications from univer-
sities were not negligible, with average 15% in 1980s and 
Figure 2. Sources of funds, types of innovation research and executive departments
Figure 3. Natural science infrastructural investment and diverse government service supports
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jgr.v4i3.3173
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1990s. Yet, ratio of records from both individuals and uni-
versities has diminished quickly though there has been an 
apparent upsurge of annual patent applications since 2000. 
The record shows that firms, contributing more than 60% 
of the total number, are the main sources of patent appli-
cations while university and research institutes contribute 
10% to 20%. In contrast, individuals contribute much less 
and the share of it decreased from over 15% in 2000 to 
less than 5% in 2015. This has been in line with the policy 
supports to high-tech firms since 2000. Authorities refer 
to public entities that are not research oriented such as 
government sectors, primary and secondary schools, and 
armies. Their applications are minimal and kept dropping 
in recent years. Among the three types of patents, utili-
ty model led the growth before 2000 but invention has 
been increasing fast in recent years. Proportion of design 
reached the peak 58.4% in 2002 but has decreased rapidly 
since then. 
Shanghai’s booming innovation activities of firms 
accord against the general shift towards a firm-centered 
S&T model in China [33]. Before 2000, individuals, uni-
versities and research institutes were critical to China’s 
innovation. Ratio of patent applications from firms were 
even lower than that from individuals during 1980s and 
1990s [1]. Yet by late 1990s, innovation policies committed 
to developing high-tech industrial firms became prevalent, 
alongside a surge of new inventions from business [34]. 
Shanghai pioneered carrying out this policy transition and 
proposed policy packages to advance intellectual proper-
ty protection, commercialization of S&T achievements, 
and financial investment on S&T enterprisesa. The result 
is a gradual increased proportion of patent applications 
from firms after 2000. Sprawling of innovation activities 
also conformed with suburban development in Shanghai, 
in particular complied with its industrial suburbaniza-
tion. Since 2000, Shanghai fostered a “1+3+9” spatial 
structure of industrial parks wherein “1” is Pudong New 
Area, “3” represents Caohejing Hi-Tech Industrial Park, 
Minhang Economic and Technology Development Zone, 
and Shanghai Chemical Industry Park, and “9” refer 
to Chongming, Jiading, Baoshan, Qingpu, Songjiang, 
Fengxian, Jinshan, Xinzhuang, and Kangqiao Industrial 
Development Zones. These industrial zones have nurtured 
a large number of firms investing and operating innova-
tion production in outskirts. As part of the optimization 
strategy of Shanghai’s metropolis structure, this industrial 
urbanization and its incubated innovation firms have re-
shaped the spatial layout of innovation-oriented capital 
accumulation [35]. 
a For instance, the “Notice of the Shanghai Municipality on Promoting 
the Transformation of New and High-tech Achievements” formulated 
in 2004, the “Shanghai Rising-Star Program” started in 2003, and the 
“Opinion of the Shanghai Municipality on Increasing Financial Service 
and Support for Technology-based SMEs” issued in 2009. 
Figure 4. Three types of patents and growth trend by years (1985-2016)
Figure 5. Patent applications by authorities, individuals, universities and research institutes, and firms (1985-2016)
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As patent applications before 2000 are negligible, this 
research has geocoded and mapped the patent records to 
reveal the spatial evolution of innovation activities after 
2000 (Figure 6). Previous studies suggest that innovation 
activities tend to cluster spatially at the national or region-
al level [36-38]. Our analysis indicates that within the city, 
innovation activities are clustered in downtown and sever-
al major planned industrial base such as Zhangjiang, Zizu, 
and Caohejing. Innovation outputs along the expressway 
is eminent, from which we may assume that most of the 
innovation activities are related to manufacturing indus-
tries, which show high sensitivity of accessibility. Spatial 
growth of patent applications is a dual process: intensity 
of innovation activities kept concentrating in central city 
particularly in Puxi whereas innovation expansion to-
wards suburb also persisted, moving towards south and 
north in the initial and diffusing across the metropolitan 
area after 2007. Innovation policy has profoundly influ-
enced this process since 2000: improvement of innovative 
soft environment has further consolidated and optimized 
the innovation edge of central city as innovation infra-
structure such as human resources, transportation, cultures 
and public services are enhanced. Alongside the “Opinion 
of Shanghai Municipal Party Committee and Shanghai 
Municipal People’s Government on Accelerating the Con-
struction of Globally Influential Science and Technology 
Center” and “Supporting Policies on Increasing Revenue 
Support to Accelerate the Construction of Globally In-
fluential Science and Technology Center” promoted in 
2015, Shanghai’s innovation has entered a new stage with 
many of the policy and institutional designs implement-
ed. Coping with the suburban policies, industrial parks as 
significant carriers for innovation activities thrived and 
facilitated expansion of innovation to outskirts where new 
industrial space takes shape and disperses. 
Figure 6. Cumulative spatial distribution of innovation 
activities in Shanghai (2000-2015)
3.2.2 Relational Aspects of Innovation Outputs 
with Urban Development
This research further inquiries into how innovation 
Table 1. Compare indices of urban innovation and urban development
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relates to Shanghai’s urban development of different di-
mensions by consulting the effects of innovation by years. 
A set of indices are developed to compare the growth rate 
of innovation and the level of urban development (Table 
1). A five-dimensional indices representing urban devel-
opment level are consulted. IAGDPs is the standard effect 
of urban innovation related to economic growth measured 
through growth rate of GDP divided by the growth rate 
of innovative activities. It is an economic index reflecting 
how innovation relates to economic performance and de-
velopment level of the city. IAPERS, IACCS and IAAQS 
are standard effect of urban innovation related to perma-
nent residents, Coal Consumption per GDP (kg/10,000 
RMB) and air quality measured by a similar method. 
They reflect how innovation relates to the improvement of 
social development level, energy efficiency, and environ-
ment quality respectively. IAEngel is effect of urban inno-
vation related to living standard improvement measured 
through growth rate of Engel coefficient divided by the 
growth rate of innovative activities. IAGDPs, IAPERs, 
and IAAQs are positive indices, meaning that the higher 
value the index is, the more innovation synchronizes with 
the particular dimension of urban development in this pe-
riod. IAEngel and IACCs are negative indices manifesting 
the opposite meaning. 
Most value fell between -1 and 1, implying that almost 
all the five dimensions of urban development level keep 
pace with the innovation development. Yet, differenc-
es remain visible. Almost in all the five-year intervals, 
growth of GDP and permanent residents positively related 
to innovation growth. However, only in the first two five-
year periods, growth of GDP outpaced that of innovation. 
Since 1996, IAGDPs has been below 1, implying that the 
growth rate of GDP fell behind that of innovative activ-
ities, but this phenomenon has been mitigated with the 
increase of the value recently. Performance of living stan-
dard is unstable. Result of IAEngel was unsatisfactory at 
the initial, with coefficient increase alongside innovation 
increase. Situation gets better in early 1990s but worse 
again since 1996 as reduction rate of Engel coefficient 
became slower than increase rate of innovation growth. 
Yet a surprising trend emerges recently that IAEngel was 
lower than -2.5 from 2011 to 2015, meaning that improve-
ment of living standard goes far beyond the innovation 
development. IAPERS value is positive but only has a 
small amount, meaning that permanent residents do not 
increase significantly when city has better performance in 
innovation. As long as Shanghai municipal government 
sticks to population control in the coming years, this trend 
may keep. From another perspective, this also means that 
innovation outputs per capita increase and that innovation 
density improves. Results of IACCs show a similar trend 
as IAGDPs. Decrease rate of coal consumption per GDP 
surpassed growth rate of innovation only in early 1990s, 
this trend has become much slower since mid-1990s but 
getting better recently (2011-2015). Air quality seems the 
most unsatisfactory dimension among all the five. Value 
of IAAQs decreases to minus 0.65, meaning that days 
with good air quality reduced and the reduction rate is 
non-negligible compared with the growth rate of innova-
tion. 
4. Conclusions
This research enriches the city-level understanding of 
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state restructuring and the consequent urban innovation 
development, from an input-output perspective. Starting 
from a country-level review of state restructuring and the 
subsequent policy change of innovation, an increasingly 
active participation of non-state actors in innovation de-
velopment with the elapse of time is identified. Though 
there have been divergent views towards whether the 
party-state in post-reform China can be label as a de-
velopmental state at the national level due to the initial 
dysfunctionality of state intervention in corporate sectors, 
findings of this research suggest that local government 
exhibits elements of LDS in innovation development, 
mainly from three aspects. First, the top-down, elite driv-
en and state-sponsored growth mode giving priority to 
technological upgrading for innovation competitiveness in 
Shanghai case is considered the key to the developmental 
state model. Second, not only the state but also the non-
state actors are motivated, collectively serving innovative 
economy to articulate the national goals. This is well 
illustrated in the synchronous, though a bit backward, pol-
icy transition towards firms-oriented innovation develop-
ment in Shanghai throughout 1990s and the concomitant 
firm-dominated spatio-temporal patterns of innovation 
clusters development. Third, professional technocracies 
are widely involved to contribute their wisdom to this in-
novation boom, which is well exemplified in the policies, 
plans, regulations made to nurture innovation. 
This research also draws some policy implications for 
innovation development in counterpart cities. First, stim-
ulating market vitality can greatly improve innovative ca-
pability and outputs, which can be observed in the soaring 
increase of science and technology expenditures and pat-
ents applications in Shanghai since 2000s after the policy 
orientation evolved more marketized and firm-centered. In 
Shanghai, policy and spatial responses to state restructur-
ing demonstrate an enhanced role of firms in innovation 
development. Under a pro-market ideology, policy support 
for firms overwhelms other type of innovation entities and 
firm innovation determines the spatial patterns and evolu-
tionary trajectory of innovation in Shanghai. Second, the 
balance between innovation and urban development es-
pecially its potential negative effects on environment and 
social development shall be paid special attention to, as 
indicated in the fluctuated, unsatisfactory relational results 
of innovation and air quality as well as Engel coefficient. 
Third, a well infrastructural support especially rapid trans-
portation system remains crucial for innovation develop-
ment in cities like Shanghai where innovative activities 
concentrate alongside the expressway and show high 
sensitivity of accessibility. But policy makers should bear 
in mind that the chase to cutting-edge technology still has 
a long way to go as current innovation outputs, implied in 
the Shanghai case, remain at the stage of mass production 
technology upgrading with many invalid and revoked pat-
ents. 
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